Big change, little change?: punctuation increments and multi-layer institutional change for English local authorities under austerity by Gardner, Alison
1 
 
Big Change, Little Change? Punctuation, 
Increments and Multi-layer Institutional 
Change for English Local Authorities Under 
Austerity. 
 
Alison Gardner 
School of Politics and International Relations 
University of Nottingham, UK. 
Correspondence address: alisongardner12@gmail.com 
  
2 
 
This paper draws on new institutionalist theories to consider how we might characterise 
the process and outcomes of change occurring in English local government as a result of 
the UK’s austerity policies.  It uses national and local empirical data to argue that 
changes are best understood as multi-layer processes, whereby radical ‘punctuated’ 
shifts in national funding can be mitigated to incremental adjustments in service 
delivery at a local level.  However, the paper also suggests that the incremental 
appearance of change may be temporary, and that diminishing institutional resilience 
and emergent discursive shifts potentially prefigure a paradigm change in local 
governance.  Hall’s (1993) framework of policy change is used to assess the extent of 
change to date. 
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There is a paradox operating within English local government which has been termed an 
‘austerity puzzle’ (Gardner and Lowndes 2016).  Between 2010 and 2015 English local 
authorities lost more than a third of their funding (NAO 2014b, 6).  Government 
spending reductions have subsequently been deepened and extended, meaning that some 
councils will lose 60% of their income by 2020 (Crewe 2016).  Yet to date – and far 
beyond early expectations (LGA 2013) - local authorities have continued to provide or 
commission a wide range of both statutory and discretionary services. A 2015 Ipsos 
Mori poll suggested that members of the public were less likely to perceive that they 
had been personally affected by spending cuts in 2015 than they had been in 2012.  
Respondents also consistently underestimated how far individual services had been cut 
(Duffy 2015).   
This begs a question about the nature and extent of austerity-related change to our 
public service institutions.  There is a tension between critical academic perspectives, 
which argue that austerity is acting to fundamentally re-shape the welfare state (see for 
instance Meegan, Kennett, Jones, and Croft, 2014; Peck, 2012; Taylor-Gooby, 2012) 
and new institutionalist accounts emphasising institutional resilience (John 2014; 
Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013).  Theoretical lenses deriving from new institutionalism 
also diverge as to whether we should understand the process of change as a ‘policy 
punctuation’, (Jones et al., 2009) or whether institutional responses are more likely to be 
incremental, as described by Streeck and Thelen (2005).   The final outcome of changes 
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occurring in response to austerity is also contested.  Hastings, Bailey Gannon et al. 
(2015) have discussed creeping ‘residualization’, focussing services on ever narrower 
sections of the community,  and Fitzgerald and Lupton (2015) have highlighted ‘limits 
to resilience’, but practitioner discourses remain pragmatic (see for instance Lyall and 
Bua 2015). This suggests that there is scope for ongoing debate on whether the changes 
resulting from austerity are likely to prove transformative for English local government, 
or whether it will remain a ‘great survivor’ (John 2014). 
This paper seeks to shed light on this empirical and theoretical puzzle by making a 
case for separating questions about processes and outcomes of institutional change.  In 
referring to institutions, it looks not only at organisations, but the ‘relatively enduring 
features of political and social life (rules, norms, procedures)’ that underpin them 
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 4).   It argues for a multi-layer and decentred view of 
institutional changes to local government, observing differing processes of change in 
both national and local layers, and accepting that locality is a key variable.  Case study 
evidence is presented to demonstrate how a national punctuated change in finance may 
be mitigated into incremental changes in local service delivery.  However, although 
incremental processes may appear to support the resilience narrative, reference to 
constructivist and discursive institutionalist theory suggests that ideational changes may 
be building the potential for more radical alterations in the future.    Halls’ (1993) 
framework of policy change is applied as a means to understand the outcomes of change 
5 
 
to date, demonstrating that incremental change associated with austerity might 
nonetheless prove transformative in its effects.   
 
The nature of institutional change: analytical considerations 
A central argument of this paper is that - within the context of a multi-layer system of 
governance - it is possible to simultaneously observe both policy punctuation and 
incremental adjustment, and that both of these mechanisms have the potential to result 
in either incremental or transformative change to outcomes.  To help illustrate this 
point, the analysis draws a deliberate distinction between the process of change 
occurring and the outcomes of that change.  
Minor adjustments do not always result in minor change.  Drawing on Dahl and 
Lindblom’s theories about incremental policy making, Cope (1994) argues that it is 
possible that a decision made incrementally could lead to a large change, and a decision 
made non-incrementally could produce a small change (Cope 1994, 341).  Goodin also 
highlights the difficulty of predicting the scale of change arising from minor 
adjustments, highlighting the possibility of both ‘threshhold’ and ‘sleeper’ effects, 
which can result in sudden and significant change (Goodin 1982, 24).  Modern 
historical institutionalists also argue that gradual adjustment can be transformative over 
the longer term (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 9) and conversely, that policies which appear 
6 
 
to effect radical change when witnessed at close hand may prove to have a relatively 
limited effect on institutions when reviewed with adequate hindsight (Pierson 1994, 14).  
In considering the change occurring as a result of austerity, it is therefore important to 
differentiate between processes and outcomes. 
 
Processes of change 
New institutionalist theory provides differing models for change processes with some 
disagreement on the pace of change.  For example Jones et al. (2009) argue that 
although patterns of public spending in the US are generally characterised by 
incremental change, they also show ‘punctuated’ instances of major change.  Using the 
geological metaphor of plate tectonics, they speculate that standard operating 
procedures, cultural norms, human perceptions and increasing institutional costs create 
‘a retarding force that interferes with the smooth adjustment of political systems to 
incoming information’ (Jones et al. 2009, 867). In the face of reductions in public 
expenditure, existing systems and policies ‘stick’ until sufficient friction builds for a 
rapid change, akin to an earthquake, although it is difficult to predict when a tipping 
point may occur.  
A more gradual (though still potentially transformative) process of change is 
offered by Streeck and Thelen, who suggest that gradual endogenous change takes place  
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through processes of displacement, layering, conversion, and drift (Streeck and Thelen 
2005, 31; Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 128).  ‘Displacement’ describes the act of 
replacing or subordinating one set of institutional rules with another, sometimes with 
rules that have previously been suppressed.  ‘Layering’ occurs when new rules are 
superimposed on previous ones, leading to the compromise and eventual defeat of the 
original rules.  ‘Conversion’ involves adapting existing rules and structures to new 
agendas through a process of reinterpretation.  ‘Drift’ describes the neglect of rules in 
response to changes in the environment, leading to slippage of practice on the ground.  
Streeck and Thelen also describe a final category of ‘exhaustion’ which is more akin to 
punctuated equilibrium, in that it encompasses a situation where the environment has 
changed to the extent that existing institutions are no longer viable or appropriate. 
In a context of multi-layer governance, punctuated and incremental processes of 
change can exist side by side.  Locality is a key variable in this process.  Several studies 
have demonstrated that austerity in England has been distributed unequally through 
decisions on grant funding and programme cuts leading to variation in the extent of the 
external shock (Audit Commission 2013; Hastings et al. 2013; NAO 2013).   In addition 
national processes of institutional change are mediated by local factors including 
resilience and agency.  The need underlying a service may be met in many different 
ways, and there is no automatic link between funding, volumes, outputs and outcomes 
(Lipsky 2010, 178).   
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Pierson  identifies four potential sources of institutional resilience: co-ordination, 
veto points, asset specificity, and positive feedback (2004, 142).  He describes how 
institutional stability is sometimes associated with the maintenance of co-ordination, 
where existing institutions constitute a stable position or equilibrium, of shared benefit 
to powerful actors, with strong disincentives to explore alternative approaches. Turning 
next to ‘veto points’, Pierson suggests institutions are more resilient if changes or 
challenges need to be agreed in a ‘self-referencing’ way by actors who have 
disincentives to altering the status quo.  Third, Pierson describes ‘asset specificity’, 
suggesting that actors with an interest in assets, such as relationships, expectations, and 
knowledge of procedures, are likely to support the continuation of activity wherever 
those assets are applied (2004, 148).  Meanwhile, ‘positive feedback’, including the 
support of key interest groups, makes the removal of institutions unattractive and their 
replacement increasingly costly.  He suggests that ‘all other things being equal, an 
institution will be more resilient, and any revisions more incremental in nature, the 
longer the institution has been in place’ (Pierson 2004, 147 emphasis Pierson's own).  
By using these categories as a framework for analysing local responses to austerity, we 
can begin to understand how and where local resilience has delayed processes of 
change. 
Agency is a further variable affecting change processes.  Mahoney and Thelen 
describe four different types of change agent within institutions, working from very 
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different motivational positions; Insurrectionaries, Subversives, Symbionts, and 
Opportunists (2010, 23).  Understanding differentiation in the objectives and 
motivations of change agents is especially useful in a local government context, because 
it takes into account that actors will have differing levels of power and divergent 
motivations or political positions, affecting their desire to promote change, or maintain 
stability.  The relative influence of each type of change agent can provide further clues 
to explain how change has been facilitated or resisted. 
In assessing processes of institutional change we should therefore take into account 
the experience of different layers of governance, the capacity for resilience and the 
influence of agency.   But how might we understand outcomes of change?  Strong 
caveats must be offered on any tentative judgements:  the relatively recent inception of 
austerity-related approaches mean that change-to-date may not be a fair reflection of 
change over a longer time frame.  Nonetheless, the experience of six years of radical 
austerity, and the recent arrival of a new UK Prime Minister and Chancellor, makes this 
an opportune moment for reflection. 
 
Outcomes of change 
In seeking to review the extent of change, it is important to recognise outcomes in terms 
of changes to ideas as well as structure.  A focus solely on formal and informal ‘rules of 
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the game’ as they are expressed in a material sense could negate significant discursive 
and ideational shifts which have the capacity to generate institutional instability.  In his 
discussion of constructivist institutionalism Colin Hay (2006, 66) suggests that  
‘ideational change invariably precedes institutional change’.  Vivien Schmidt also 
emphasises the way in which discursive institutionalism complements other types of 
institutionalism by providing a means to understand (often unexpected) change against 
structural and material background factors (Schmidt 2008, 314).    
Discursive and material elements are combined in Peter Hall’s (1993) study of 
economic policymaking.  Hall outlines three ‘orders’ of policy change: 
 First order change describes changes in the levels or settings of policy instruments, 
whilst the overall goals and instruments of policy remain the same.   
 Second order change; suggests changes to the techniques or instruments used to 
attain policy goals.   
 Third order change; argues for changes in all three components of policy; 
instrument settings, the instruments themselves and the hierarchy of goals behind 
the policy.  Hall describes this type of change as ‘rare’ with an example being the 
shift from Keynesian to monetarist modes of macroeconomic regulation. (278-279).   
This framework can be operationalised in relation to local governance.  Whilst 
alterations to the ‘settings’ and ‘instruments’ of first and second order change might 
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manifest in a local governance setting as material changes to budgets and institutions 
(see table 1), Hall’s third order ‘paradigm’ change is primarily discursive;  involving 
changes to ‘a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of 
policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very 
nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing’ (Hall 1993, 279).   
 
Table 1 here. 
 
Hall also suggests that his paradigms can be ‘competing’ or ‘not fully elaborated’ 
(1993, 291) suggesting that transformational shifts may not always be distinct.  The 
model is somewhat limited by its linear nature, the categorisation implying a stepped or 
staged approach (whereas Hay and Schmidt’s perspectives suggest that we might see 
third order policy change before second order change is observed.)  However, for the 
purposes of this analysis, Hall’s framework provides a helpful starting point for 
analysing outcomes of change enacted in response to austerity, albeit with a strong 
degree of caution. 
 
Case study and methods 
In applying the theoretical framework outlined above, this paper has drawn on both 
national and local data, gathered between 2013 and 2015 in the course of doctoral 
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research into how local public services were responding to austerity.  National 
observations are drawn from a literature review and secondary data, whilst local 
observations relate to a single exploratory case study of institutional responses to 
austerity across a Labour-controlled urban unitary local authority area.   
The single case study approach was chosen as a means to observe effects of 
austerity beyond comparison of cuts to services, considering discursive and ideational 
consequences, as well as material effects.  A deep understanding of local context was 
critical to this analysis, and might have been obscured by a larger ‘n’ study.  The 
approach acknowledges austerity’s contingent and localised impacts, including 
differential effects from the recession and varying distribution of spending cuts.  It is 
rooted in an epistemological perspective which does not deny the material effects of 
austerity policies, but accepts that ‘realities’ of austerity are localised and specific 
(Furlong & Marsh 2010, 190; Peck 2012, 647).  
The selected case provided an excellent exemplar of the ‘austerity puzzle’ in 
practice, experiencing a cash-terms reduction in ‘revenue spending power’ of 22% 
between 2010 and 2015
1
.  Employment in the local area had been severely impacted by 
the recession and subsequent spending cuts, due to a high reliance on the service sector 
and public sector employers.  The locality also had a legacy of poverty and deprivation, 
                                                             
1 Revenue spending power represents UK Government’s assessment of funding available to each local 
authority to spend on core services.  It rests on a contested formula, but is recognised by the National 
Audit Office as the most reliable means for wider financial comparison (NAO 2014b, 24) 
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being amongst the top 20 most deprived local authority areas in the country.  Yet 
despite delivering more than £100 million of savings (in the context of a 2010 revenue 
budget of £273 million), an analysis of budget lines using a framework drawn from 
Hastings et. al. (2013) showed that only 5% of savings arose from reductions in the 
range of services provided.  At the same time, resident satisfaction with the area and 
local authority services climbed from a low base to above the national average, and the 
local authority was nationally recognised for innovation in transport and energy 
management (Gardner 2016, 144-157).  
Fieldwork used a collaborative action-research approach, involving budgetary 
analysis, a document review, two workshops with frontline service teams and a total of 
34 semi-structured interviews.  Interviews cited within this article include three 
executive councillors (EM 1, 2 3), four council directors (CD 1, 2 3 and 4), an interview 
with two former council directors (CFD) one council middle manager (CM1) and five 
Council frontline officers (CO 1-5) as well board members from different partner 
agencies engaged in in local service delivery (PBM 1-5).  
The validity of the research was tested in a variety of ways (following Lather 
2003).  ‘Construct validity’ was strengthened through the application of multiple 
theoretical perspectives and research methods. Potential researcher bias was mitigated 
through the action-research strategy, which required reflexivity coupled with a 
stakeholder-reviewed collaborative approach to research design.  ‘Face validity’ was 
14 
 
established through the maintenance of dialogue with research subjects and the 
distribution and discussion of findings.  Data triangulation was enhanced by mixed 
methods, and in the case of workshops, observer triangulation. 
Two key propositions are considered, rooted in the austerity puzzle conundrum.  
The first proposition considered processes, positing that if austerity-related change was 
indeed minimal, change processes would be characterised by incremental change, rather 
than ‘punctuated equilibrium’.  The second proposition addressed outcomes, suggesting 
that austerity policies would be delivered with minimal (first order) change to local 
governance and systems.      Although the findings in relation to the single case cannot 
be generalised to apply to other localities and contexts, they can be generalised to theory 
(following Yin, 1994) and are utilised in this paper to explore these propositions and the 
theoretical framework outlined above.  
 
National and local processes of change: from punctuation to mitigation 
A strong case can be made for viewing the emergency budget and Comprehensive 
Spending Review of 2010 as a national financial policy punctuation, understanding 
punctuation as ‘a discontinuous pattern, characterised by a large sudden shift in 
attention that departs from a long period of stability’ (John and Bevan 2012). The 28 per 
cent cuts (HM Treasury 2010) to local government’s central grant funding instigated in 
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2010 represented an unprecedented reversal in public spending, unequalled since the 
second world war (Taylor-Gooby 2012). Changes to local government’s grant formula 
were accompanied by a de-coupling of the previous link between rates of deprivation 
and funding, with a regressive redistributive effect, meaning the difference in spending 
between English authorities in the most and least deprived bands fell from 45 per cent in 
2010/11 to just 17 per cent in 2014/15 (Hastings et al. 2015, 16). 
Yet despite this punctuation, the changes in institutional processes observed in the 
local case study were initially characterised by minor adjustments to services, with 
savings mainly being achieved through cuts to the ‘back office’ and internal 
restructuring.  However, it was possible that this phase of incrementalism was 
temporary.   By the latter half of the spending review period, tried and tested 
mechanisms to achieve savings were starting to be supplemented by more radical 
approaches.   
The analysis produced evidence for an evolving approach to managing the ‘budget 
gap’ (Hastings et al. 2013, 15), which moved from an incremental approach of minor 
cuts or  ‘salami-slices’ from departmental budgets, to seeking more substantial savings 
through ambitious transformation programmes.  Whilst a core set of policy priorities 
were protected, there was a marked shift between 2010 and 2015 from incremental 
savings to more fundamental re-design of services.  This did not happen in a radical 
moment of change; indeed one director commented, ‘I don’t think this is a place that 
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does radical, because the ideology is quite traditional in some ways’ (CD1).  Instead, 
although outward policy ‘rules’ were maintained, it was possible to detect changes to 
the informal elements which underpinned institutions of service delivery. These changes 
could be related to Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) categories of conversion, layering, 
displacement, and drift. 
For example, in relation to its workforce management, the council ‘converted’ its 
policy justification for staff benefits during the period of study, from being a ‘good 
employer’ to highlighting advantages for improved efficiency.  ‘Layering’ was apparent 
in the way in which the council overlaid the strength of council-provided contract 
services with what one manager termed ‘a more energetic appetite’ for external 
commercial activity (CM1).  ‘Displacement’ accurately described a controversial policy 
of exchanging the voluntary and community sector grant funding system for a new 
‘commissioning’ process, which distributed funding through contracts awarded on a 
competitive basis.  There were also changes in core policies around eligibility for 
services and grants, and cuts to early intervention schemes, consistent with concepts of 
policy drift and exhaustion.  As policies shifted, fresh debates also opened on the norms 
and aspirations for service provision, with one interviewee explaining that the council’s 
aims had changed from acting as a paternalistic provider, to a situation where 
communities were being left to ‘sort themselves out’ (CO1). 
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Whilst such subtle shifts were appreciable mainly to actors within the system, they 
represented a destabilisation of the institutions underpinning service delivery.  The 
gradual move towards more radical responses could be likened to the pace of an athlete 
on a treadmill which was speeding up: as the pace (or requirement for budgetary 
savings) became more challenging, the strides (or movements away from existing ways 
of doing things) began to increase.  In summary, the radical financial punctuation had 
been mitigated into small, incremental shifts, but the transformational potential of those 
incremental changes, which suggested different goals of service delivery and challenged 
formerly dominant narratives, was increasing as time progressed. 
 
The erosion of institutional resilience from national and local 
perspectives 
Using Paul Pierson’s ideas on institutional resilience it is also possible to see how 
sources of institutional resilience, which would normally act to prevent the revision of 
local government institutions, were gradually being eroded.   
For example in relation to co-ordination, the council had historically defended its 
identity as a local service provider, circumventing laws on compulsory competitive 
tendering.   National policies to promote outsourcing had generally been resisted by 
both council members and officers (CD2, EM3, CO4, CO5) and bringing services back 
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in house was encouraged, although this was justified on cost, rather than ideological 
grounds (EM3).   
Nonetheless, it was clear from the local case that – whilst it was defending a role in 
service delivery - market-driven approaches to co-ordination were growing in 
importance in comparison to state-driven models.  This was evidenced by the 
exploration of outsourcing in relation to specific functions (CD2, CD4) growth in 
commissioning approaches and moving from ‘gift’ or grant-based relationships with the 
voluntary sector to ‘transactional’ commissioning-based relations (CFD).  Although the 
adoption of commercial practices was presented as a twist on state co-ordination (CD3, 
EM3) this tactic also acknowledged the dominance of a market-driven philosophy of 
service delivery.  There had also been some withdrawal from the council’s community 
co-ordination activities, making space for other partners to exercise some of its local 
‘convening’ functions.   In effect, state-centred approaches were being challenged and 
eroded as the council’s financial power reduced, and market-driven and communitarian 
approaches were increasingly influential. 
Turning next to ‘veto points’, from a national perspective, councils remained highly 
constrained legally, financially and politically.  For example, the 2011 Localism Act 
had installed what Pierson terms a ‘self-referencing’ institutional veto against raising 
Council Tax above a limit set annually by central government.  Councils were 
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theoretically able to hold local referenda to increase taxes, but had very strong political 
disincentives to taking that path (NAO 2014, 33).
2
   
Locally, gaps between legislation and implementation provided some leeway for 
local interpretation, with one director commenting ‘we do what we want to do anyway.  
People think local government has these edicts they have to work to, but if they are not 
locally appropriate you can find a way around them’ (CD2).  Yet as another director 
noted, open insurrection was also relatively rare, especially when it involved court 
action (CD4).   Elected members were clear that they could not set an unbalanced 
budget, and their only route was to ‘manage despite the cuts’ (EM3, CO1).  Thus, 
although the council was able to mitigate the effects of financial reductions on services, 
it had little scope to prevent those effects within the limits of its own veto.   
In relation to ‘asset specificity’ and ‘positive feedback’, although English local 
government as an institution dates back to the 19
th
 century, its physical, professional and 
political assets, have come under a sustained attack at national level, pre-dating 
austerity.  Physical assets such as council housing and property have been 
systematically reduced.  The rise of new public management techniques in the 1990s 
weakened the power-base of the local government professions, whilst local government 
                                                             
2 A 4.75 per cent Council Tax rise which would have triggered a referendum was explored by Brighton 
and Hove Council in 2014, but eventually rejected by opposition parties.  In 2015 the Police and Crime 
Commissioner in Bedfordshire triggered a local referendum when he proposed a rise of 15.8 per cent in 
the Council Tax allocated to policing.  The proposal was rejected. 
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unions were neutralised under the ‘new’ Labour government (Laffin 2009, 27).  These 
factors  may have contributed to the uncontested 16.6 per cent reduction in the staff base 
between 2010 and 2013 (NAO 2014b, 8).  Local politics has also been weakened in 
processes stretching back many years; anxiety about local electoral turnout was evident 
in the early years of the ‘new’ Labour governments (DETR 1998; Cole 2003).  With 
diminishing physical assets, professional interests, and popular support, local 
government lacks sources of ‘positive feedback’.  
Compared to this national context, the local case nonetheless had some features 
which enhanced its institutional resilience.  The council had a large property portfolio, 
managed through a number of trusts, which allowed it to use land and property to 
strengthen inter-organisational bonds, generate income, and facilitate investment 
(EM3).   A high level of political continuity promoted stability in relationships between 
council members and other civic elites, supporting increasing depth and maturity of 
high-level partnership collaboration.  The council had also been consistent in its policy 
of protecting assets relating to service delivery, such as the bus company and district 
heating system.  Such building blocks were crucial as the basis for innovation and 
delivery of initiatives such as a light rail project and local energy company, despite the 
context of spending cuts.   
Despite this, the council was not able to entirely insulate itself from the erosion of 
assets.  Although not excessive in the context of similar areas, the reduction in staff base 
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was 23 per cent between 2010 and 2013.  This loss of personnel, coupled with a drop in 
financial power, contributed to changes in relationships with some partners; from a trust 
and support based environment to a more contract-led basis; and from the ability to 
promote direct action, to an environment where progress depended on influence and 
‘wheeling and dealing’ (PBM3).   Shared services (provided jointly with other councils) 
were being piloted in relation to human resources and payroll, and new management 
models were being explored with other statutory agencies, such as the police.  
Drawing together this evidence on the processes of change, it can be argued that as 
processes of institutional change appeared to accelerate, our local case study’s sources 
of resilience were also being steadily eroded.  The council had less influence and choice 
in the form of ‘co-ordination’ it provided; self-referencing veto points prevented 
contestation of the cuts; assets specific to the local authority were under pressure; and 
there was limited positive feedback to sustain the current institutional forms: indeed 
these were already changing.   
 
Processes of local agency 
The effect of individual actors on local change processes was complex, indeed elements 
of institutional ‘maintenance, defence, revision and discovery’ (Streeck, cited in 
Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 136) could be observed from the interviews.  In considering 
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the role of actors, the analysis adapted Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010, 23) definitions to 
take account of how actors worked to maintain or undermine institutions and contest 
institutional change (as well as enact it) against the external shock of austerity.  In this 
analysis, insurrectionaries became the defenders of institutions, who wished to preserve 
local services against prevailing financial pressure; subversives aimed at maintenance, 
providing the appearance of conformity with change, but using loopholes to pursue an 
anti-austerity agenda; symbionts outwardly supported the organisation’s stance on 
austerity, but had sympathy with some objectives of austerity policies and the aim of 
‘never wasting a good crisis’; whilst opportunists were intent on discovery, looking for 
creative possibilities within change. 
Although opportunities for outright insurrectionary resistance to austerity were 
severely constrained, interviews certainly showed evidence of a politically-inspired 
defence against the ramifications of the spending cuts and welfare reform.  One policy 
officer commented that ‘everything’s a fight’, alluding to resistance to welfare reform 
proposals (CO3).  Another frontline officer said she was ‘impressed’ with how vocal the 
council had been in contesting the ‘bedroom tax’ (CO2).  Certain routes for achieving 
savings also remained taboo, with outsourcing considered as a ‘red line’ for many 
interviewees (CD2, EM3, CO4, CO5).   
More commonly there was evidence for ‘subversion’ as apparent compliance with 
the government’s agenda was subtly aligned with the council’s policy priorities.  A 
23 
 
repeated refrain was that the council was ‘not taking it lying down’ (CO3, CO4) with 
activity in opposition to central policies taking place in the ‘grey area’ between 
legislation and implementation (CD2).  This included, for example, a commitment to 
funding welfare rights in order to maximise benefits take up; an unwritten policy of 
trying to avoid evictions related directly to the ‘bedroom tax’ (EM2), and the 
mobilization of ‘commercialisation’ in a way that could ‘take us back to big council 
departments’ (CD3). 
However amongst interviewees, and particularly senior officers and partners, there 
were also examples of ‘symbionts’ who sought to use the pressures arising from 
austerity to promote revision of processes and institutions.  These included the director 
who described commercialism as a ‘Trojan horse’ to get councillors ‘into the right 
territory for a sensible discussion’ (CD1) and partners who were keen to radically 
reform the existing shape of the public sector (PBM 2, PBM5).  A private sector service 
provider commented that the officer body sometimes tended to behave as a ‘small c’ 
conservative force, but that the ‘C’ had become bigger with retrenchment, inferring that 
officers were now using right-wing values in designing and implementing policies.  The 
extension of cost-driven commissioning approaches was cited as an example of these 
values in practice (PBM4).    
It could also be argued that the mantle of ‘symbiont’ could in some senses also be 
extended to senior politicians, as by committing to ‘manage within the cuts’, the 
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political leadership had created a context where compromises were inevitable.  One 
director referred to the sense of compromise, saying that members had, in the main, 
‘been able to navigate the difference between their policy differences and staying true to 
their values, to minimise the worst impact of it, but it has been hard’ (CD1). 
There were also a number of examples of opportunism, embodied in actors who 
were seeking to discover new models of delivery.  These included members, partner 
organisations and council staff who were seeking to explore how to shift the balance of 
power and responsibility between the council and the community (EM1, CO2, 
Workshop 2014b).  Another example of opportunism in action was the move to use the 
context of austerity to re-define the central / local relationship, through arguing for 
devolution in combination with freedom from central grant funding (CD3). 
In practice the council found itself drawing on all these motivations and 
perspectives to identify novel ways of meeting the budget gap.  The outcome of this 
diverse agency was essentially that in the short-term the punctuated change instigated 
by budget cuts was being modified.  As one senior manager put it austerity had not ‘de-
railed the agenda’ and was being actively mitigated ‘within constraints’ (CM1).  
However, as the financial pressure grew, defensive and maintenance-focussed strategies 
championed by insurrectionaries and subversives were supplemented by novel and 
revisionist proposals from symbionts and opportunist players.  This was demonstrated 
by comments showing how austerity was encouraging policy makers to embed reforms 
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that had formerly been resisted.  One director commented that ‘we’ve really softened up 
the boundaries over the years.  We had to say “please don’t stifle the ideas”’ (CD1).  
Another longstanding director reflected that some of these changes had multiple 
antecedents, for instance greater involvement of the private sector could be traced back 
to the use of Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and Local Improvement Finance Trust 
(LIFT) schemes for health-related capital investment.  As he put it, such delivery 
mechanisms ‘became the routes available to provide bread and butter as opposed to the 
cream, it’s happened organically’ (CD4).   
To summarise, although it is possible to agree that the local change processes 
instigated in response to austerity were initially characterised by incremental change 
rather than ‘punctuated equilibrium’, this may have been the result of mitigating 
responses, which could be temporary in their effects.  Over the longer term institutional 
and agential sources of resilience were being challenged as the financial pressure acted 
to embed change at a material and discursive level.  In effect our case study provided a 
working example of what Pierson terms ‘longer term incremental changes’, which are 
‘typically invisible’ in studies of political phenomena, but ‘crucial in creating the 
preconditions for institutional reform’ (2004, 164).  By considering the outcomes of 
austerity related change, the next part of this paper will assess how far that reform has 
progressed to date.   
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Outcomes of change  
Whilst a longer time scale and greater historical distance is arguably needed to properly 
appreciate the long-term outcomes of austerity measures, Hall’s framework of first 
second and third order policy change assists in taking stock of the extent of change to 
date.   
 
A) Evidence for first order change: changing the settings 
There is extensive national and local evidence for ‘first order change’ or alterations 
to the ‘settings on the instruments’ within local government, interpreting ‘settings’ as 
budgetary changes, changes in functions and service volumes.  Over a longer time scale, 
analysis could also include service quality, but data on changes to service quality is only 
starting to emerge, and thus remains an item for future research to consider in more 
detail. 
While the extent of budgetary reductions is disputed between national and local 
actors, it is plain that substantial budget reductions have occurred, in our case study 
amounting to a (minimum) cash terms reduction of 22 per cent in revenue spending 
power between 2010 and 2015/16.  The majority of savings to date were being delivered 
through ‘efficiencies’, including the 23 per cent cut to the overall staff base and 
significant reductions in the amounts paid to other service providers.  This in turn led to 
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a reduction in the volume of some services, for instance in community development, 
youth and highways services, plus reductions in contract value, impacting for instance 
on early intervention services to prevent homelessness.  The picture in our case is 
consistent with wider research which has shown that budget reductions were initially 
managed through efficiency savings and reductions in service volumes, rather than 
reductions in the range of functions (Audit Commission 2013, 5; NAO 2014b, 33; 
Hastings et al., 2015: 609).  More extensive retrenchment is thought to be likely in the 
future as opportunities for efficiencies are exhausted (Hastings et al. 2013).   
 
B) Evidence for second order change: changing the instruments 
Second order change implies changing the techniques or instruments of policy in pursuit 
of policy goals.  In local government’s case the implication would be moving away 
from traditional structures and institutions to new forms of delivery.  This type of 
change is also in evidence both nationally and locally, although in many cases 
traditional institutional bodies still persist alongside new delivery mechanisms.   
In the national layer we can see increased austerity driving the adoption of ‘shared 
services’ between councils and cross-border collaboration: in 2015 there were 416 
shared service arrangements occurring between councils across the country delivering in 
£462 million of efficiency savings, compared to 173 such arrangements in 2012 (Local 
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Government Association 2015).  Inter-agency collaboration has also been promoted by 
the integration of public health with local government in 2013, and although this change 
was not wholly driven by austerity, siting public health in local councils has resulted in 
challenges to the costs of local public health interventions (Iacobucci 2014). 
There have also been innovations in institutional form for the purposes of economic 
development, including sub-regional Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), combined 
authorities, and devolution of additional tax-raising powers (conditional on installation 
of ‘metro mayors’).  This emerging institutional form is closely linked to arguments for 
creating economically viable city-regions, which could eventually be governed without 
central government grant funding (Core Cities 2013).  Despite being promoted as a 
‘devolution revolution’ (Osborne 2015) the strategy is also arguably a policy manoeuvre 
to transfer accountability for austerity-related cuts (Lowndes and Gardner 2016).  
In our case study, changes to policy instruments were at an early stage, but 
nonetheless in evidence.  Shared services, management, and combined authority 
arrangements were under discussion.  Although there had been surprisingly little change 
to the formal organisational arrangements at least one partner felt that public sector 
integration could be taken much further (PBM2).  At an ideational level, the 
development of commercialisation could be seen as an alternative type of second order 
change, introducing a fresh set of policy instruments to achieve the council’s objectives.  
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Equally significant were areas where the council was transferring responsibilities to 
service users and local communities (CM1, CO1, CO5).  
 
C) Evidence for third order change: changing the goals 
If first and second order change can be identified, is there also evidence for a more 
fundamental third order change? 
Multiple commentators have argued that austerity is being used by the Coalition 
(and now Conservative) government to advance an ideological agenda which aims to 
dismantle the welfare state and embed neo-liberal policy agendas into public services 
(see for instance Clarke and Newman 2012; Levitas 2012; Newman, 2013; Taylor-
Gooby and Stoker 2011; and Wilks-Heeg 2011).  To date institutions have endured the 
spending cuts, but there have been warnings that further cuts are unlikely to be achieved 
whilst maintaining existing institutions and meeting existing statutory requirements 
(Hastings et al. 2013; NAO 2014a).  In Hall’s terms the ‘policy anomalies’ and 
‘frequent policy failures’ that presage a major third order change may be starting to 
appear on the radar, embodied – for instance - in recurrent political debates about 
affordable housing and funding for adult social care. 
Given this national context, to what extent can symptoms of third order change be 
detected locally? The case study examined here remains a solid Labour council, having 
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maintained that position for more than 25 years, making it – at least in theory - less 
open to the ideological drivers behind austerity.  Yet despite the outward appearance of 
stability, we have discussed how our council’s institutions were being challenged at a 
narrative and discursive level, moving from state centred models of service delivery to 
an ethos more closely identified with market-led forms of co-ordination.  It could 
therefore be argued that the steady financial pressure accompanying austerity was 
eroding the ‘third order’ goals of the organisation, forcing political compromise and 
narrowing expectation of what the local state could achieve.  A partner articulated this 
shift commenting that the ‘neo-liberal agenda has been taken on board uncritically’ 
there was a need to ‘become a more progressive authority’ (PBM1).  Although such 
reflections were not widely expressed by officers and members, subtle shifts in policies 
and discourses suggested that austerity had the potential to be transformative in its long 
term effects. 
 
9.7 Conclusions 
This paper has used national and local data to explore the nature of change resulting 
from austerity, arguing that it is possible, in a multi-layer governance context, to have 
different processes of change occurring simultaneously.  It has also suggested that the 
process of change is not necessarily a determinant of the change outcome, helping to 
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explain how shifts that – at surface level – appear subtle and incremental can 
nonetheless underpin transformation.  Thus the theoretical tensions outlined in the 
‘austerity puzzle’ at the beginning of this paper can be resolved within this framework: 
local authorities may indeed be resilient, and change processes appear incremental, but 
it is too early to rule out the possibility of a punctuated shift in public services, or 
fundamental ‘third order’ change.   
In the case study locality, despite the national policy punctuation, organisations had 
(mainly) retained their form, albeit under considerable pressure, and actors had 
combined to devise ways of navigating the crisis.  However, the increasingly radical 
steps needed to meet budget deficits meant that this mitigation seemed likely to be 
temporary.  Regarding the outcomes of change, although (in Hall’s terms) second order 
changes remained fairly minimal, this was in line with the theory that ideas 
underpinning institutions at a discursive level would change before institutions were 
altered at a material level (Hay 2006). The goals of local public service delivery were 
actively under debate amongst key local actors, potentially presaging a third-order 
transformation in local services.   
The framework outlined in this paper would clearly be enhanced by testing over a 
longer time period, to examine whether discursive shifts eventually re-shape the sticky 
instruments of governance, or whether other ‘threshold’ or ‘sleeper’ effects from 
incremental adjustments emerge to promote significant change (Goodin 1982, 24).  It 
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could also form the basis for an examination of institutional change in comparative 
perspective; exploring what processes and outcomes of change are observed in areas 
with distinct political contexts, asset bases, and relative levels of grant cuts.  These 
factors, in combination with a nuanced consideration of the role of agency, could teach 
us much about the basis of local government’s resilience to date.   
From a policy perspective, Coalition policy architects should also be wary of 
assumptions that austerity is a policy ‘success’, having apparently delivered 
transformative change without disruptive punctuations in services at the frontline.  
Whilst it is true that a legislative, financial and normative framework has restricted 
councils with opposition political views from exercising extensive resistance, 
‘punctuated’ policy shifts may be only temporarily delayed.    Hall highlights that policy 
anomalies presage third order change, and Baumgartner and Jones also caution that 
‘prior to a major quake there is seismic activity’ (Baumgartner and Jones 2002, 296).  
Reports in the press have highlighted that increasing numbers of councils are entering 
severe financial difficulties and in danger of becoming insolvent (Municipal Journal 
2015a; Municipal Journal 2015b).  The referendum decision for ‘Brexit’ is also likely to 
impact most severely – in terms of withdrawal of European funding - on those areas that 
have already borne the most radical spending cuts (Beatty and Fothergill 2013).    
With this in mind, the time is perhaps ripe for a wider and more purposeful policy 
conversation on the institutions appropriate to the emerging discursive paradigm that 
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frames our public services.  To date austerity has been a largely reactive process, with 
policy responses such English ‘devolution’, constrained by a narrow menu of options 
designed to fit existing structures, boundaries and funding models.  A more forward-
looking dialogue between academics, practitioners and policymakers, recognising the 
new goals and contexts of service delivery, could perhaps contribute towards more 
imaginative, effective and resilient institutional responses.   
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Table 1: Institutional change outcomes 
Type of 
change 
Order of change Application to this study 
Material 1
st
 order (settings) Budgetary changes, adjustments to functions, 
service volumes and quality. 
Material 2
nd
 order 
(instruments) 
Implies a move away from existing structures 
and institutions, to new forms of delivery. 
Discursive 3
rd
 order (goals) Implies a change in political values / goals 
